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This paper seeks to establish whether the structural-operational definition of the sector, used by the John
Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project (JHCNSP), is universal in its applicability.  Historical case
studies of primary health care and social housing provision in nineteenth-century England demonstrate
that the definition cannot accommodate the institutional diversity of earlier periods and does not produce
meaningful sectoral distinctions.  The structural-operational definition rules out of the sector a significant
proportion of non-statutory, non-profit maximising providers.  In particular, it excludes the mutual aid
organisations which are widely recognised as important for the development of civil society and which
have historically been considered to be key components of the sector. These case studies suggest that the
structural-operational definition limits the capacity of the JHCNSP to fulfil its aim of establishing “the
factors that promote or retard the sector’s development” due to potential measurement errors and because
of the pattern of development which the project implicitly assumes for the non-profit sector.
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1 Introduction
It has long been recognised that individuals and communities choose to associate and meet their
needs for goods and services through institutions other than states, markets or households.  During
the last quarter of the twentieth-century, however, there have been increasingly formalised attempts
to organise the study of these institutions through the development of a language and set of theories
which delineate a distinctive sector (Hall, 1992).  The problem has been that as new scholars enter
the field they have brought alternative definitions of the subject area with them.  Institutions which
are neither statutory, nor profit maximising, have been collectively and variously called the
voluntary, third, non-profit, or more recently, civil society, sector.  Scant attention has been given to
how these various and competing definitions relate to one another (L hm n, 1992).  Which
institutions should be ruled in, or out, of these over-lapping, but potentially different sectors?
A major contribution has been made towards the development of a common definition by the
explicitly comparative non-profit sector project directed by Salamon and Anheier.  The Johns
Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project (JHCNSP) represents the most comprehensive
attempt by social scientists to define the “third sector” as occupying a distinctive social space outside
of both the market and the state (Sal mon and Anheier, 1997, p. 1).  The project was launched in
1990 to inquire “into the scope, structure, history, legal position, and role of the non-profit sector in
a broad cross-section of nations” (Salamon and Anheier, 1997, p. xi).  In order to facilitate
comparative analysis, the first task of the project was to “formulate a common language and concept
of the ‘non-profit’ sector” (Salamon and Anheier, 1997, p. 4).  Drawing on existing definitions and
the empirical realities of various nations under study, the project developed, what Anh ier and
Salamon term, the “structural-operational definition” of the non-profit sector (Salamon and
Anheier, 1992).
The structural-operational definition has been used to map the non-profit sector in a variety of
nations with differing levels of economic development, legal frameworks and institutional
experiences of social welfare provision.  The initial 12 nations included in the project were selected
to cover a variety of what have been called “historical traditions” and the project has subsequently
been extended to include a further 32 countries (Salamon,Anheier and Associates, 1998; and
2Salamon et al, 1999 ).  If the structural-operational definition is capable of accommodating the
variety of social and economic circumstances included within comparative cross-sectional analysis
of this sort, it should also have relevance and meaning when used to analyse the institutional
diversity of earlier periods.  But, is the structural-operational definition sufficiently universal to
meet this challenge?  Applying contemporary definitions of the non-profit sector in different
historical contexts can provide us with new insights into some of the implicit assumptions that may
underpin our thinking today and demonstrate how our definitions may be contextually specific.
This paper offers a critique of the Johns Hopkins’ structural-operational definition.  Whilst the
definition has been used to great effect in providing us with a large comparative map of the sector, it
is not truly universal in its applicability.  Historical data are used to demonstrate the contextual
specificity of the structural-operational definition, which suggests some of the weaknesses inherent
in attempting to test theories of the sector with data compiled using this definition.  In particular, it
is argued that the non-profit sector as mapped by this exercise cannot be transposed into the civil
society sector that provides the current focus of interest for many scholars in the field.  Section two
of the paper considers why we might want to define the sector before considering some of the
definitions that are frequently used.  In section three the structural-operational definition is applied
to the institutional arrangements used to deliver primary health care and social housing services in
nineteenth-century Britain.  Section four concludes by drawing out some of the general implications
of this historical critique.
2 Defining the non-profit sector
Before examining how we define the non-profit sector we should consider why we might want to do
so.  Organisations which are neither statutory, nor profit maximising, will be referred to here as
third-sector organisations: the term “non-profit sector” will be reserved to denote the sector as
defined using the structural-operational definition, which will be discussed later.  There are a
number of reasons why defining a third sector may be a worthwhile exercise.  In order to identify
these various reasons it is useful to categorise three different sets of interest associated with
particular functional characteristics of third-sector organisations.  These characteristics all imply
that third-sector organisations may fulfil particular roles for society which make them worthy of
study on a sectoral basis.  The first strand in the literature suggests that the function of non-profit
organisations is to produce public, or collective type goods for society.  Weisbr d (1988) argues that
governments and non-profit organisations are better than market institutions at supplying public
goods and when the electorates’ demands for these goods are heterogeneous, then non-profit
organisations, rather than governments, will supply them.  Even when demands are not
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heterogeneous we could suggest that governments may pr fer to subsidise the provision of public
goods by the third sector, rather than bear the full cost of supplying them.  Alternatively, Salamon
has suggested, voluntary organisations may ‘fail’ in their service provision, resulting in government
subsidy (Salamon, 1987).  Once governments have subsidised the sector using public funds, for
whatever reason, they then have an obligation to keep track of s ctoral performance.
The second category of thinking about the functions of third-sector organisations suggests that they
may differ from for-profit and statutory agencies in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness with
which they deliver goods and services.  Hansmann suggests that third-sector organisations are better
at supplying goods to consumers in cases of  “contract failure” (Hansmann, 1986).  Contract failure
occurs, according to Hansmann, in circumstances when it is difficult to monitor the quality of the
good or service being produced.  This may be because of information asymmetries caused by a
purchaser/provider split, or because the good has collective type benefits.  Consumers therefore
prefer non-profit distributing organisations where there is less incentive for producers to act
opportunistically to exploit their informational advantage (Hansm nn, 1986).  In these cases it is
suggested that third-sector organisations will be more efficient and effective than their for-profit
counterparts.
Billis and Glennerster (1998) offer an alternative perspective on the comparative advantage of third-
sector organisations.  By looking at the nature of demand for human services, they argue that these
organisations are effective and efficient in providing services for consumers who suffer financial,
personal, societal or community disadvantage.  In social policy terms, it would be a costly and time
consuming process to direct public resources towards those organisations which can be individually
identified as operating with particular efficiency and effectiveness.  Thus, it may be in the interests
of policy makers to have a clearly defined third s ctor which they can use as an instrument of public
policy.  In addition, if third-sector organisations behave differently than for-profits as economic
institutions, this may warrant separate treatment in national income accounts.
The third category of interest in the third sector is rather different from the first two.  This strand of
debate argues that the salient characteristics of third-sector organisations are the positive
externalities that they create for society.  The focus here is not on the product supplied by these
organisations, but on the externalities of the process by which they do so.  The most obvious
example here is the work of Putnam on civil society and social capital (1993, 1995).  Putnam argues
that third-sector organisations have a particular role to play in fostering social capital, which he
defines as “the features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve
the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions” (1993, p. 167).  The third sector fosters
4social capital that in turn promotes economic growth and contributes to the healthy operation of
democratic societies.  Putnam and other civil society theorists are not interested in whether the
manifest purposes of third-sector organisations are to produce public goods, or effectively and
efficiently supply private goods; they wish to identify those organisations which generate social
capital.
Methodologically, one of the principal reasons for defining the non-profit sector is to facilitate
comparison over time and space.  This enables us to address questions such as: Is the non-profit
sector more or less developed in various nations?  And, what may account for this variation?  But
equally important is the temporal comparison: Has the sector expanded or contracted over time and
if so, why?  International cross-sectional analysis is revealing as it provides us with a lot of variance:
each country has a different mix of legal and political systems, economic development, or historical
and religious “traditions”, which may all be explanatory variables determining the scale, scope and
functions of the sector.
In order to explore each of these sets of interest in the third sector, and to test the hypotheses which
they generate, we need a definition of the types of organisations which they encompass.  Definitions
of the third sector are essentially aggregates of a set of organi a i ns which are collectively
considered to possess characteristics that set them apart from states, markets or households.  There
are three types of distinctive features which, individually or collectively, produce different
definitions of the sector.  The first relates to the nature of the inputs to the organisation; the second
to the outputs, the nature of the goods and services they provide; whilst the third concerns how
organisations distribute their surplus revenue.
There are two different ways of defining the third sector according to its inputs: one focuses on its
income and the other on the supply of labour.  The United Nations System of National Accounts is
an example of an income-based definition in which non-profits are organisations whose activities
are financed primarily by dues and contributions.  This definition, however, provides a very partial
map of the sector.  It fails to take account of the primacy of government grants as a source of income
for many non-profits.  In addition, many non-profits receive income from sales and fees which has
led Hansmann to distinguish between “donative” and “commercial” non-profits (Hansmann, 1987).
Our second input-based definition of the sector is based on the source of its labour.  This definition
produces what is usually referred to as the “voluntary” sector as this definition emphasises the
un-coerced and un-remunerated inputs of volunteers (Kendall and Knapp, 1995).  But, as we know,
paid employees constitute a major labour input to the sector.  In addition, defining the sector
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according to volunteer labour makes it hard to distinguish it from households and the informal
sector without the addition of further defining characteristics.
Alternatively, we can define the sector by focussing on its outputs, as in the case of the Elizabethan
Statute of Charitable Uses (Chesterman, 1979).  But as with all “public purpose” definitions, the
range of organisations whose activities may be considered to serve public purposes is subject to
change over time and between nations.  Lohmann has suggested a resolution to this problem by
referring to institutions with “common” rather than “public” purposes, thereby allowing for the
inclusion in the sector of institutions which only serve the interest of particular groups (Lohmann,
1992).  The most formal specification of “public purpose”, however, is derived from the literature on
the economics of the non-profit sector which closely ties together the question of the definition and
purpose of the sector.  Weisbrod (1988) provides us with a partial definition of the non-profit sector
as composed of non-governmental organisations providing collective-type goods.  This public
purpose of the output is, however, only one element of the definition of the non-profit sector used by
Weisbrod: the other relates to the formal constraints that may exist upon the distribution of the
organisations surplus revenue, which represents our third type of definition.
Hansmann’s definition of non-profit organisations is not based on either their inputs, or their
outputs, but the way in which they distribute their financial resources (Hansmann, 1986; and
Steinberg and Gray, 1992).  Non-profit distributing organisations are those which are barred from
distributing “net earnings” to individuals that exercise control over them.  This “non-distribution
constraint” is similar to the legal definition of a non-profit institution in the US.  The problem with
legal definitions of the sector is that they vary according to the legal system and country in which
they are employed.  The non-distribution constraint, however, has been widely accepted as a
definition of non-profits outside the US legal system.
Despite its widespread usage, H nsmann’s definition of the “non-distribution constraint” does not
produce an unambiguous third sector.  He defines “net earnings” as “Earnings in excess of the
amount needed to pay for services rendered to the o ganization.”  Hansmann adds that “in general, a
non-profit is free to pay reasonable compensation to any person for labour or capital that he
provides, whether or not that person exercises some control over the rganization” (1986, pp. 58-9).
“Reasonable compensation”, however, is a largely disregarded but contentious phrase.  In economic
terms a dividend represents compensation to the investor for risk and income foregone: At what
level does this dividend payment cease to be “reasonable” and become profit distribution?  Thus, in
economic terms the non-distribution constraint could define a third s ctor which includes joint stock
6companies paying dividends equivalent to the market rate of return on other investments of
comparable risk.
None of the above definitions of the third sector produce the same combination of constituent
member organisations.  Different scholars choose different definitions according to the questions
they wish to address.  A universal definition, by contrast, would be applicable in all contexts and
provide us with a basis from which we could compile data to test a variety of theories about the
sector.  Does the JHCNSP offer us a definition of the sector which is up to this task?  Before
addressing this question we should consider how the Johns Hopkins’ project defines non-profit
organisations.  The structural-operational definition identifies five key characteristics which these
organisations must share (S lamon and Anheier, 1992 and 1997):
1. Organised, i.e. institutionalised to some degree in terms of their organisational form or system of
operation;
2. Private, i.e. institutionally separate from government;
3. Non-profit-distributing, i.e. not returning any profits generated to their owners or directors but
ploughing them back into the basic mission of the agency;
4. Self-governing, i.e. equipped with their own internal apparatus for governance; and
5. Voluntary, i.e. involving some meaningful degree of voluntary participation, either in the operation
or management of the organisation’s affairs.
The sector is thus defined as the collection of entities which make a “reasonable showing” on each of the
above five criteria.  The structural-operational definition encompasses organisations which may fulfil a
variety of functions; it does not focus attention exclusively on institutions providing public goods, or
efficiently and effectively supplying private goods, or on organisations which offer positive externalities for
society.  It should therefore be able to accommodate the majority of our interests in the sector.  But can this
definition be truly universal in its application?  Or, does it contain implicit assumptions which are
contextually specific and which may direct us towards rejecting or accepting various hypotheses about the
sector?
These questions will be explored using historical analysis.  In the following section the structural-
operational definition will be applied to two historical case studies of welfare provision in nineteenth-
century England. Using the examples of primary health care and social housing we will consider whether
the application of this definition produces sectoral distinctions which have historical utility and which
meet our various interests in the sector.
3 Historical analysis of the non-profit sector
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The Johns Hopkins team formulated their definition of the non-profit sector to facilitate
geographically comparative analysis in the present.  Whilst they did not use this definition for any
historical analysis, applying it using data from the past offers us a valid test of the universal
applicability of their institutional model.  For a sect al map to be useful it should comprise a set of
institutions whose common characteristics can be widely recognised.  Asking whether the Johns
Hopkins non-profit sector is recognisable to Brazilians, or Latin American scholars, is in a sense the
same question as asking whether the Victorians, or historians of that period, would have considered
the institutions grouped by the structural-operational definition to represent a distinctive sector.  The
application of one definition to countries as diverse as Japan and Brazil in the present, sugg sts the
definition should be equally applicable to historical data.  Differences in time should be no more
problematic for a universal definition than differences in space.  In addition, Salamon and A heier
have taken data compiled using the structural-operational definition to test various theories about
the sector, which are not, themselves, temporally specific.
Temporal comparison possesses certain advantages over international cross-sectional analysis.
Geographically comparative research can produce so much variance that it is difficult to identify
casual relationships.  This problem may be formally addressed with the use of regression analysis
which ceteris paribus identifies the explanatory “power” of individual variables.  However, given
the lack of a dominant underlying theory of the sector, analysis of this sort tends to be ad hoc.  If we
do adopt an d hoc approach to determining the growth or strength of the sector, which indicators
do we take for the legal system, or culture, or economic development?  We have no simple metric to
encapsulate these.  Salamon and Anheier (1998) have used the data compiled by the Johns Hopkins
project to test various non-profit theories using the sort of quantitative cross-sectional analysis under
discussion here.  They have avoided the pitfalls of ad hoc multivariate analysis by performing
bivariate tests of hypotheses generated by specific theories of the sector. Steinberg and Young,
however, have suggested that Salamon and Anheier have mis-specified some of their models by
failing to take account of the complementarity of various theories.  In addition, Steinberg and
Young have questioned whether some of the variables which Sa amon and Anheier have chosen are
the most appropriate indicators of what they are trying to measure (Steinb rg and Young, 1998).
Historical analysis is less susceptible to the variance problem that can be associated with
geographically comparative research.  The advantage of historical research is that some of our
potential explanatory variables can be held fairly constant: legal and political systems, or that
intangible phenomenon called “culture”, are relatively static within nations, at least in the short run.
The principal disadvantage is that it is easy to conflate correlation with causation if only one nation
is studied at a time.  In single nation studies, we cannot determine whether a potentially causal
8factor was also present in another country where the observed outcomes differ.  This limitation of
single nation history, however, is not problematic for the approach taken in this paper.
The purpose of the historical analysis to follow is to examine whether the structural-operational
definition of the sector is capable of accommodating the institutional diversity of an earlier period in
England’s history.  The two historical case studies selected for this paper have been chosen to reflect
a variety of interests in the functional purpose of third-sector organisations.  The institutions
providing primary health care were principally providing private benefits for their members.  In so
far as the mutual organisations which provided some of these services were receptacles of social
capital, these organisations also offered the possibility of some positive externalities for the wider
society.  The housing problem, on the other hand was part of a concern about public health, which
can be seen as a public good.  In addition, the Victorians considered physical health to be
inextricably linked to social and economic health.  It was argued that if the poor lived in more
salubrious surroundings they would also become better members of society and more economically
productive.  In this sense there were also positive externalities to be gained from the provision of,
what we would call today, social housing.  We will now turn to consider the first case study: primary
health care provision in nineteenth-century England.
3.1 Primary health care
In Victorian England there were many different institutional mechanisms through which qualified
medical practitioners delivered primary health care to patients.  These mechanisms embraced simple
fee-for-service arrangements between doctor and patient, collective purchasing schemes organised
on both solidaristic and for-profit principles, public provision through poor law agencies, and purely
charitable care provided by dispensaries and hospitals.  The major historical study of the medical
market in England by Digby identifies three tiers of patients who, in turn, made use of different
institutional routes to medical care.  The poorest patients “utilised charitable dispensaries, free out-
patient departments in voluntary hospitals, and the facilities of the poor law – either the poor law
infirmary, or the services of the poor-law medical officer.”  The middle tier of patients “paid for
their medical services less through individual fees than through subscription to friendly societies –
thus providing for themselves mainly through collective action.”  Priv te fee-for-service treatment
was the norm only for an upper tier of middle-class patients, although the surviving records of a
handful of general practitioners indicate that private patients could cover “every social class, from
gentry to servant”, with differential fees charged according to ability to pay (Digby, 1994, pp. 50-51,
115, 148-55).
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Friendly societies provided for many more: Riley estimates that in 1900 over 45 per cent of adult
working-class males had acquired the right to medical attendance through their friendly society
membership (Riley, 1997, p. 49).  A higher estimate has been constructed by Green, who has
(somewhat casually) attempted to combine data for works clubs as well as registered and
unregistered friendly societies.  He believes that “at least 9 million of the 12 million originally
included in the National Insurance scheme were already members of friendly societies offering
medical care” (Green, 1985, p. 95).  Even so, several million adult males, and the majority of
women and children, were left unprovided for by the friendly society movement, and had little
option but to turn to charitable and public medical services or, if they could afford it, to for-profit
collective provision organised by commercial companies or by doctors themselves.
The boundaries between these different institutional forms of primary care provision were blurred.
Riley notes that although each system had a target population, the groups they served overlapped at
the edges (Riley, 1997, p. 87).  Furthermore, it was quite possible for the same household to be in
simultaneous receipt of primary health care from different institutions, with women and children
turning to a different provider to that of the male head of household.  In addition, working-class
people could expect to use a variety of health care providers over their life course, with childhood
and old age being more reliant on non-market provision.  This complex institutional network of
primary care provision is difficult to locate within a public/private welfare dichotomy.  A simplistic
separation according to institutional form would obscure the fact that the medical care delivered by
the different institutions was often similar: in some cases even identical because the same medical
personnel worked in several different institutions (Marland, 1987).
The similarity of medical output produced by quite distinct institutional forms of primary care
provision makes this sector a good test-bed for Salamon and Anheier’s structural-operational
definition of the non-profit sector.  We can use their five-point definition to distinguish the non-
profit from other forms of primary health care in the nineteenth century, and can then consider the
extent to which these distinctions are meaningful.  In table 1 the different types of primary care
provision are arranged in three groups which roughly correspond to Digby’s tiers of private practice,
collective provision and public/charitable medical care.
It is no surprise that, within the first tier of provision, private practice is located unambiguously
outside the non-profit sector according to the structural-operational criteria.  Even so there could be
a small “voluntary” element in so far as some doctors might treat impoverished patients in the
knowledge that their quarterly or annual bills were unlikely ever to be paid (i.e., they did not expect
to receive “reasonable compensation” for their services, to use Hansmann’s terminology).  A second
type of fee-for-service medical care in which there was not even this minimal voluntary element was
10
that offered by “sixpenny doctors” who established themselves in poor communities, and offered
low-price consultations for cash (Digby, 1994, pp. 51, 159).
Third tier provision of medical care came from charitable and public suppliers and within this group
of providers, poor law facilities (infirmaries and medical officers) are excluded from the non-profit
sector on most criteria.  There is, however, some minor ambiguity about the degree of voluntary
effort incorporated within the poor law, since guardians were not remunerated.  However, both
provident dispensaries and the out-patient departments of voluntary hospitals fulfil all the criteria
for inclusion in the non-profit sector: they were organised, independent of the state, self-governing,
reliant on a significant amount of voluntary input, and – crucially – did not distribute profits to
owners or members.








Private practice 6 4 6 6 4/6
‘Sixpenny
doctors’
6 4 6 6 6
2nd tier
Friendly society 4 4 6 4 4
Works club 4 4 6 4/6 4
Doctor’s club 4 4 6 6 6
Medical aid
company




4 4 4 4 4
Voluntary
hospital
4 4 4 4 4
Poor law 4 6 6 6 4/6
Second tier institutions provided primary care for subscribers through some type of collective action,
but the institutional form could vary significantly.  Friendly societies were self-governing, private
voluntary organisations in which members combined to purchase medical services from doctors who
were remunerated on either a capit tion or flat-fee basis.  Works clubs were similar, though in some
cases employer influence in the management of the club compromised the degree of self-
government.  However, collective action was not the sole preserve of consumers.  Many suppli ,
either individual doctors or groups of doctors, offered contract medical services to customers in
return for regular weekly payments, as did medical aid companies, which were purely commercial
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organisations which collected contributions from clients and contracted with doctors to provide a
minimum level of medical attendance (Green, 1985, pp. 8-12).  Whilst doctors’ clubs and medical
aid companies operated in the market in order to generate profits, friendly societies and works clubs
have been viewed by most historians as self-help organisations which had goals other than profit-
maximisation: in Green’s words, they were “self-governing, fraternal associations for mutual aid”
(Green, 1985, p. 12; Riley, 1997).  However, the strict definition of the non-profit constraint in the
structural-operational definition excludes friendly societies (and most other mutual organisations
such as building societies and co-operatives) because they have an ability to distribute profits to
members – for instance, by using surpluses to reduce premiums – rather than being required to
plough back all surpluses for the collective good (Kendall and Knapp, 1997, p. 271).
Using the structural-operational definition, friendly societies drift in a limbo, excluded from the
non-profit sector, yet distinct in their form and operation from for-profit medical aid companies.  In
the British volume of the Johns Hopkins study, Kendall and Knapp make explicit reference to
friendly societies, building societies, co-operative societies and trade unions, most of which “are
excluded from our broad definition of the sector because of their quasi-commercial character”
(Kendall and Knapp, 1996, p. 71).  Yet, from the historical perspective, contemporaries would have
conceived of these “self-help” and mutual insurance organisations as part of what we would call in
Britain, the voluntary sector.  Friendly societies were considered to be distinct from for-profit
institutions.  Even in the mid-twentieth century, Beveridge considered voluntary action to have two
components: “mutual aid” and “philanthropy” (Beveridge, 1948, pp. 8-9).  Mutual aid was
exemplified for Beveridge by exactly the sorts of institutions which Kendall and Knapp excluded.
Whilst it is true that the de-mutualisation of recent years has made some building societies just like
banks, we should bear in mind that in the nineteenth, and for much of the twentieth century, this
was not the case.  Thus, the exclusion of these organisations due to the potential for distribution to
their members should be questioned in an historical context.  The potential for distribution,
however, highlights the fact that friendly societies were “member-serving” rather than “public-
serving” institutions as their primary concern was to provide private benefits for their members.
Whilst the Johns Hopkins project deliberately eschews any criterion of “public purpose” as a
defining characteristic of non-profit organisations due to problems of establishing a universally
applicable definition of  “public benefit”, in practice the inclusion of the non-distribution criterion
weights the sector against those institutions providing essentially private welfare benefits (Salamon
and Anheier, 1997, pp. 31-2, 37-8; Kendall and Knapp, 1997, pp. 19-20).
Table 1 demonstrates that the structural-operational definition of the non-profit sector excludes the
majority of mechanisms used to provide primary medical care to the majority of people in
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nineteenth-century England.  By grouping together in the excluded category fee-for-service private
practice, commercial contract practice, and mutual (friendly society) provision, it blurs all
distinctions between market and non-market services, between individualistic and collective
behaviour.  It is not clear that, in terms of their function as institutions for providing welfare
services, there were appreciable differences in the outputs of those that are included and those that
are excluded from the structural-operational definition of non-profit primary health care
arrangements.
Does the structural-operational definition mask some of the similarities and differences in both function
and institutional form of those agencies which it excludes because of peculiarities in the systems of
provision of primary health care in the nineteenth century?  Or, is this system of categorisation more
generally incapable of accommodating the institutional diversity of earlier periods?  In a partial attempt to
address this question, we now turn to our second case study: the provision of housing for the working
classes in Victorian London.
3.2 Social housing provision
Both the housing problem and the responses to it were rather different in character from the essentially
private risk of ill health.  The housing problem concerned the private rental sector which was considered
to be both inefficient and inequitable in terms of the quantity and quality of housing that it provided for the
working classes.  The lifestyles and living conditions of those living in slums were considered by
contemporaries to generate a number of socially unacceptable externali ies which were at odds with the
public interest as they conceived it.  Thus, the housing problem was a public problem which was perceived
to threaten the physical, moral, social and even economic health of society.  Addressing this problem of
externalities required a system of housing provision which generated collective-type benefits to be enjoyed
by the wider society, not just those who financed and consumed more salubrious working-class
accommodation.  From the 1840s onwards, a group of new institutions were formed which attempted to
find a practical way to combine the public and private interest in improving the housing of the working
classes.
Whilst we do not know either the total number or output of those organisations providing improved
dwellings throughout England, Morris has estimated that at least 43 organisations were established
between 1840 and 1914 in response to the housing problem in London: 31 of these organisations produced
over 35,000 dwellings during this period which was over two and a half times the combined contributions
of the London County Council, the metropolitan boroughs and the City Corporation during the same
period.  These housing organisations provided between 11 and 15 per cent of all new working-class
accommodation built in London between 1856 and 1914 (Morris, 1998, pp. 60-9, 259-60).
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Despite the similarities in the aims, outputs and systems of operation of the organisations providing model
dwellings, they adopted a variety of institutional forms.  The first institutional form was that of the
charitable trust, founded by a wealthy individual: perhaps the best known example is the Peabody Trust
(PT), founded in 1862 by the donation of £150,000 from George Peabody for the London poor.  The
second, exemplified by the Society for Improving the Condition of the Labouring Classes (SICLC), was
the subscription charity which raised funds from donors in order to provide housing for their working-
class clients.  The third type of voluntary sector provision was pioneered by Octavia Hill as a system of
“improving tenants in old houses” through the purchase of existing dilapidated properties which were then
managed and improved by Hill’s team of lady rent collectors (SCALDI, 1882; and Wohl, 1971).  The
fourth and most innovative institutional form was adopted by the “model dwellings companies” (MDCs)
which were registered as limited liability joint stock companies.  Yet, MDCs har d similar aims to the
more traditional charities providing social housing, rather than making profit maximisation their primary
aim.  Both the similarity of aims of the four types of response made to the housing problem, and the
collective nature of the social benefit which they were intending to produce, make nineteenth-century
social housing an ideal test case for the structural-operational definition of the non-profit sector.  Table 2
shows how each of the four institutional responses outlined above perform when measured against the
structural-operational definition’s five-point classification.







Charitable trusts 4 4 4 4 4
Subscription charities 4 4 4 4 4
Octavia Hill system 6 4 6 4 4/ 6
Model Dwellings
Companies
4 4 6 4 6
Subscription charities and charitable trusts, such as the SICLC or PT, are clearly located within the non-
profit sector as they score positively on all five of the structural-operational definition’s criteria.  The
position of Octavia Hill’s system is, however, more ambiguous.  First, whilst the method of housing
provision and management developed by Hill is usually referred to as her “system”, she eschewed formal
organisation of her work.  Hill was opposed to working with a committee and “profoundly distrusted
systems and machinery and feared that working on a larger scale would mean working for a system”
(Lewis, 1991, p. 34; Whelan, 1998, p. 119).  Secondly, her “system” also fails the non-distribution
constraint.  This is because she financed her work by encouraging various friends and acquaintances to
purchase the leases for single or small groups of existing houses which she then managed, paying them
around a five per cent return (Hill, 1883; Maurice, 1913, pp. 189-190; Maurice, 1928, pp. 162-3; Wohl,
1971, pp. 106-7).  The voluntary component of Hill’s work is also ambiguous.  Her method of housing
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management was premised upon an intensive system of visiting and rent collection by lady visitors, yet
Hill had difficulties finding sufficient volunteer workers to manage her housing and an unknown
proportion of her staff were hired hands (Lewis, 1991, p. 55; Whelan, 1998, pp. 83-5).  The structural-
operational definition is not sufficiently specific about the nature of a ‘meaningful degree of voluntary
participation’ for us to determine whether Hill’s use of paid workers excludes her work from the non-profit
sector on this ground.
Model dwellings companies are the other insti utions which do not meet the structural-operational
definition’s criteria.  As joint stock limited liability companies, they violate the non-distribution constraint
in that they paid dividends to their shareholders.  MDCs al o lack the necessary voluntary component in
their operation as housing management was performed by paid staff whilst the directors received
remuneration for their services, although one could argue that this was merely to cover their expenses
(Morris, 1998).  Octavia Hill’s “system” and MDCs are excluded from the non-profit sector as defined by
the structural-operational definition.  As they all satisfy the private criterion of being “institutionally
separate from government”, they are therefore relegated to the same part of the organisational universe as
for-profit firms.  Yet, the principal objective of these organisations was not to maximise profits, but to
solve the social problems caused by the very sector from which the structural-operational definition is
incapable of distinguishing them.
The application of the structural-operational definition to social housing provision in nineteenth-century
England has reduced the non-profit housing sector to two types of institutions: subscription charities and
charitable foundations.  What are the implications of this?  The non-profit sector thus defined only
includes the smallest providers of social housing provision.  Of the 35,000 units referred to above nearly
70 per cent were provided by MDCs which therefore dominated purely charitable effort in this field
(Morris, 1998, p. 180).  It is by no means clear that the distinction drawn using the structural-operational
definition, between non-profit and other providers of social housing, would have had any practical
meaning to contemporaries.  Not only did the different organisations formed in response to the housing
problem adopt similar aims and methods of operation to one another, they also housed broadly similar
tenants (Morris, 1998, pp. 75-95).  In addition, MDCs charged below market rents, which were in many
cases equivalent to those charged by the non-distributing organisations in the field (Morris, 1998, pp. 218-
9).  If we are interested in analysing the outcomes of the responses made to the Victorian housing problem,
the structural-operational definition of the non-profit sector does not include those organisations which did
the most both for their tenants and to address the public interest in this issue.
By applying the Johns Hopkins structural-operational definition of the non-profit sector to the range of
institutions which provided primary health care and social housing in nineteenth-century England, an
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important point has emerged.   In both cases the definition excludes the major institutions operating in the
field.  What were considered to be social welfare agencies in the nineteenth century appear to be
indistinguishable from for-profit companies using twentieth-century definitions.  This paper concludes by
considering the broader implications of these case studies for the application of the JHCNSP’s attempt to
develop a universal definition of the sector.
4 Implications of the historical critique
The JHCNSP has advanced our knowledge about the non-profit sector, but is it able to fulfil all of its
aims?  Taking the project’s aims one by one: the team clarified “the scope, structure and financial
base” of the non-profit sector and in doing so provided a “better foundation for public and private
policies.”  Awareness of the sector has certainly increased, as has the “local capacity to carry this
work forward in the future” (Salamon and Anheier, 1996a, p. 8).  The fulfilment of objective two,
however, is more problematic: establishing the “factors that promote or retard the sector’s
development” is an important issue, not least with respect to the public policy objective of the
project.  The historical case studies presented above suggest that the structural-operational definition
has two major limitations affecting its ability to fulfil this objective: the first problem concerns
possible measurement errors and the second pertains to the pattern of development which Salamon
and Anheier implicitly assume for the non-profit sector.
Taking the issue of measurement error first, the advantage of comparative research is that it
provides us with multiple variables which we can use to develop or test theories explaining the
development of the sector.  The first stage of the JHCNSP was the development of the structural-
operational definition which was then used for the data collection exercise which followed.  Once
collected, these data offer a potentially rich source which can be used to test various theories about
the sector.  The paradox is, that whilst a standardised definition was necessary to facilitate this
comparative research, the definition has not necessarily produced an appropriate dataset for testing
the competing theories which may explain the patterns of sec oral development which are apparent
in the data.  The historical examples of primary health care and social housing can provide a
worked example of this type of problem.  In these nineteenth-century case studies, the most
important provider institutions are excluded from the structural-operational definition of the non-
profit sector, so this sector appears small.  The subsequent expansion of state providers of health
care and housing in the twentieth-century thus appears to fill a gap in service provision, and offers
prima facie support for Salamon’s “voluntary failure hypothesis” (Salamon, 1987).  The problem is
that the structural-operational definition of the non-profit sector, which excludes the majority of
voluntary sector provision in the earlier period, inevitably biases findings towards confirmation of
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this particular hypothesis.  As Steinberg and Young have suggested “the definition of a non-profit
organisation appropriate for testing one (theory) may differ from the most appropriate definition for
testing another” (Steinberg and Young, 1998, p. 250).
It is the non-distribution constraint which is the most problematic criterion of the structural-
operational definition.  Although Salamon and Anheier eschew definitions of the sector which
characterise it by its “public purpose”, they argue that the non-profit distributing criterion acts to
distinguish private organisations which exist primarily to generate profits from non-profit
organisations which are private organisations with a public purpose (Salamon and Anheier, 1996a,
p. 14).  Although it may be desirable to differentiate profit maximising organisations from
institutions with a public purpose, the non-distribution constraint is not an infallible test.  Behind
Hansmann’s theory about the role of non-profit enterprise lies the idea that particular institutional
forms are associated with particular welfare outcomes which may be more or less in the private
interests of the organisation’s owners or managers.  The degree of public benefit is assumed to be in
inverse relationship to the private benefit.  Yet, this assumed causal link between form and function
does not necessarily hold, as the historical example of social housing provision shows.  Those
nineteenth-century institutions which distributed some profits to their members were most
successful in their aim of providing more salubrious housing for the working classes for the benefit
of society as a whole.  By examining only those institutions with a particular form, we can neither
prove, nor falsify, our assumptions about the func ions which this form may offer.
Whilst the Johns Hopkins project has provided a new and rich comparative database about the non-
profit sector, this sector as measured is not necessarily equivalent to, or in some cases compatible
with, the third sector as conceived elsewhere in the literature.  In their recent paper, Salamon and
Anheier (1998) have used Johns Hopkins data on the non-profit sector to extend their commentary
to the area of “civil society”, whilst the recent book published by the project is entitled Gl bal Civil
Society: Dimensions of the Non-profit Sector (Salamon et al, 1999).  This sectoral transposition,
from the non-profit to civil society sectors, however, is not as unproblematic as they imply.
Our historical case studies have shown that the structural-operational definition excludes the mutual
aid societies which, according to Beveridge, provided a check against state control and the
profiteering of the market in conjunction with other philanthropic organisations (Beveridge, 1948,
pp. 322-3).  Beveridge’s concern with the contribution of these organisations to the health and
happiness of a democratic society is similar to the interests which civil society theorists have in
third-sector organisations today.  The non-profit sector, as defined by the structural-operational
definition, therefore, cannot be simply transposed into the civil society sector, without disregard for
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both the theory of social capital and the vibrancy of civil society both historically and in different
nations.
According to Lyons, civil society “is focussed on organisations that would be classed as providing
membership benefit rather than public benefit” (Lyons, 1996, p. 11).  For Putnam it is the presence
of “mutual aid societies, directly analogous to …the ‘friendly societies’ of Britain’ which represent
one of the most ‘important manifestations’ of (the) ‘Principle of association’ of Northern Italy”
(Putnam, 1993, p. 139). Similarly, Dekker and van den Broek (1998, p. 13) “propose voluntariness
as the guiding principle of civil society and associations as the dominant collective actors”.  The
structural-operational definition excludes the very organisations which are likely to be doing the
most to foster social capital.  By providing a mechanism through which their members could pool
their risks, friendly societies arguably offered more opportunities for face to face interaction and the
fostering of trust and social capital than the alternative forms of organisation which the structural-
operational definition recognises as belonging to the non-profit sector (Johnson, 1984; Green, 1985;
and Gorsky, 1998).
The prevalence of mutual associations providing member benefits is also problematic for attempts to
define the non-profit sector in developing nations today.  In the JHCNSP volume on the non-profit
sector in the developing world, attention is drawn to the credit and savings associations of West
Africa (Atingdui et al, 1998).  Even though the project recognised the role of such organisations in
“economic, social and community development”, they can only be included within the project’s
definition of the non-profit sector if they fulfil all five of the structural-operational definition’s
criteria (Salamon and Anheier, 1996b).  If members are able to fix the interest rates which they pay
on loans and receive on savings, they are arguably able to distribute surplus revenue amongst
themselves and hence they violate the non-distribution constraint.  It would require a very careful
examination of the constitution of such organisations to see whether they can in fact meet the five
criteria of the structural-operational definition.
Even if they can distribute surplus revenue to their members, mutual aid organisations may still
fulfil very important functions for society where both the state and commercial companies have
failed.  For example, the local credit unions of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh aim to encourage
collective action and empower the poor rather than simply provide them with capital (Holcombe,
1995).  Yet, the strict application of the structural-operational definition would consign them to the
for-profit sector along with the commercial banks which have been both ineffective and inefficient
in supplying capital to the poor, let alone providing the positive externalities of association which
membership of a local Gr meen branch is intended to encourage.  In addition, if we move away
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from considering the position of credit and savings associations, we find that Edwards has made
more general criticisms of the JHCNSP for excluding the informal associations which he argues
play such an important role in poverty alleviation and development (Edwards, 1999).
The capacity of the JHCNSP to establish the “factors that promote or retard the sectors’
development” is also constrained by the pattern of development which Salamon and An eier
implicitly assume for the non-profit sector.  They have claimed that the Johns Hopkins database
offers the opportunity “to shed new light on the factors which seem to account for the growth and
development of this sector in an assortment of countries around the world” (Salamon and Anheier,
1998, p. 214).  Whilst this is undoubtedly true, it cannot shed as much light on the sector’s
development as the project leaders would like.  It is difficult to account for growth, which occurs
over time, using cross-sectional data.  To infer a temporal path of development from cross-sectional
data implicitly assumes that there is a uniline r path to development and that each country
represents a different stage along that path; this discounts the importance of historical experience.
In their comments on historical development, Salamon and Anheier (1998, p. 226) criticise existing
theories for assuming “a degree of flexibility in institutional choice” that seems “belied by the
historical record”.  They argue that “Choices about whether to rely on market, non-profit, or state
provision of key services are not simply made freely by consumers in an open market as advocates of
economic theories seem to assume.  Rather, these choices are heavily constrained by prior patterns
of historical development that significantly shape the range of options available at a given time and
place”.  Although this view appears to be an exposition of what economic historians call “path
dependency”, the methodology of the JHCNSP in fact assumes and implies a common
developmental path for the non-profit sector.
The use of a fixed definition of the non-profit sector across time reveals how the sector, as defined,
changed in different historical circumstances.  What it cannot do is capture the experiences of other
institutional types which contemporaries may have developed in their attempts to fulfil various
welfare objectives.  It may be the case that it was past experience of these other institutions,
excluded by a universalist definition, which promoted or retarded the development of the non-profit
sector.  This is a proposition which requires more empirical testing, rather than theoretical
deduction based on current perceptions.  Peter Dobkin Hall (1992, p. 14) suggests that one cannot
write a single “progressivist” history of a non-profit sector.  He argues that the non-profit sector as
we know it today, is a construct of the recent past.  A full understanding of the functions of various
institutions, and the factors which have contributed to their development over time, must be
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sensitive to the contexts and contemporary debates which surround them.  The institutional choices
that were made yesterday influence the course of the developmental path that can be followed today.
To return to our initial question regarding the universal applicability of the John Hopkin’s definition
of the non-profit sector, we have seen that the structural-operational definition is unable to cope
with the institutional diversity of earlier periods.  Subjecting this definition to temporal comparison
has also revealed limitations to the project’s capacity to fulfil its second objective of establishing
“the factors that promote or retard the sector’s development”.  Salamon and Anheier’s attempts to
subject various theories about the non-profit sector to empirical testing us ng data from the project is
certainly a welcome development.  The contextual specificity of the structural-operational definition,
however, represents a serious limitation to the universality of th  conclusions that may be drawn
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